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Abstract 
 
It is well known that women are underrepresented in the academic systems of many 
countries. Gender discrimination is one of the factors that could contribute to this 
phenomenon. This study considers a recent national academic recruitment campaign in 
Italy, examining whether women are subject to more or less bias than men. The findings 
show that no gender-related differences occur among the candidates who benefit from 
positive bias, while among those candidates affected by negative bias, the incidence of 
women is lower than that of men. Among the factors that determine success in a 
competition for an academic position, the number of the applicant’s career years in the 
same university as the committee members assumes greater weight for male candidates 
than for females. Being of the same gender as the committee president is also a factor that 
assumes greater weight for male applicants. On the other hand, for female applicants, the 
presence of a full professor in the same university with the same family name as the 
candidate assumes greater weight than for male candidates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is commonly understood that women are underrepresented in the research systems 
of many countries. In fact the data on national research staffing reveal a significant gap 
in the presence of women. Only four of 28 OECD nations2 (Portugal, Estonia, Slovak 
Republic, Iceland) have a percentage of women greater than 40% in their national 
systems, and in none of these cases does female representation exceed 46% (OECD 
2014). In the UK, women represent only 38.3% of total researchers, and in Italy only 
34.5%. In France the share drops below 26.0%, and in Germany below 25%. Women 
researchers in Japan make up just 13.8% of the national staff. Although the four Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) are popularly considered progressive in 
women’s rights, in these nations male scientists still outnumber their female colleagues 
two to one. The question that naturally arises is which of a series of factors could be the 
cause of this underrepresentation: lower numbers of women graduates; less interest 
among women for research activity; lesser scientific merit, and/or phenomena of gender 
bias in recruitment processes. The intention of the present work is to verify the hypothesis 
of the latter cause, thus contributing to a line of current studies on gender bias in the 
recruitment of academic staff (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012: 
van den Brink et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2003; Fuchs et al., 2001). One branch of this 
literature demonstrates that discriminatory phenomena tend to appear when evaluations 
are not based on transparent criteria (Rees, 2004; Ziegler, 2001; Husu, 2000; Ledwith and 
Manfredi, 2000; Allen, 1988). In effect, academic recruitment is often described as an 
informal process, in which a few powerful professors promote or select new professors 
through mechanisms of cooptation (van den Brink et al., 2010; Husu, 2000; Fogelberg et 
al., 1999; Evans, 1995). A series of studies also show that women professors progress 
more slowly through academic ranks, tend not to attain important leadership roles, and 
earn less than men in comparable positions (Rotbart et al., 2012; Bilimoria and Liang, 
2011; McGuire et al., 2004; Wright et al., 2003). The fact that women are 
underrepresented in decision-making positions appears to reduce probabilities for the 
recruitment and advancement of female candidates (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Corrice, 
2009). De Paola and Scoppa (2015) find that “female candidates are less likely to be 
promoted when the committee is composed exclusively by males, while the gender gap 
disappears when the candidates are evaluated by a mixed sex committee”. Zinovyeva and 
Bagues (2015, 2011) find that in competitions for full professor positions in Spain, 
evaluators tend to favor candidates who belong to their own academic network and are 
also of the same gender. In Italy, Abramo et al. (2015a) observed a moderate positive 
association between competitions with expected outcomes and the fact that the committee 
president was a woman. Bagues et al. (2014) estimated the causal effect of the gender 
composition of committees in the 2012 Italian competitions for qualification for associate 
and full professor positions. Differently from other studies, they found that each 
additional female evaluator decreases the success rate of female candidates by 2 
percentage points. 
The results of the preceding two studies on the Italian case are in our opinion not 
necessarily to be considered in disagreement. In fact the positive link between the 
increasing presence of women in the competition committees and the consideration of 
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merit over favoritism (Abramo et al., 2015a) could coexist with the link between the 
increase in female representation in the committees and the diminution of success rates 
for women candidates (Bagues et al., 2014). The joint observations would indeed be 
logical, since it has been shown that female researchers are less productive than males in 
most disciplines (Larivière et al., 2013; Mauleón and Bordons, 2006; Xie and Shauman, 
2004; Long, 1992; Fox, 1983), although gender differences are lessening over time 
(Frietsch et al., 2009; Abramo et al., 2009a; Alonso-Arroyo et al., 2007; Leahey, 2006; 
Xie and Shauman, 1998; Cole and Zuckerman, 1984). Moreover, the productivity gap is 
especially remarkable among top scientists (Abramo et al., 2009b; Bordons et al., 2003), 
who are those more likely to apply for higher academic positions. 
The Italian context is particularly suited to studies of gender bias given the high rate 
of favoritism in competitions for the public sector, which includes the university sphere. 
According to The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 (Schwab, 2013), Italy ranks 
126th out of 148 countries in favoritism in decisions of government officials. It is no 
surprise then that the nationally governed competitions for faculty positions have come 
under frequent fire, and that the Italian word “concorso” has gained international note for 
its implications of rigged competition, favoritism, nepotism and other unfair selection 
practices (Gerosa, 2001). Cases of favoritism in the faculty recruitment have been the 
subject of frequent media attention, and have even arrived before the courts (Zagaria, 
2007; Perotti, 2008). A series of empirical studies have demonstrated that in Italy, 
scientific merit is not always the prevailing criteria for selection (Abramo et al., 2015b, 
2014a, 2014b; Allesina, 2011; Durante et al., 2011, 2009). 
In a context where favoritism is very diffuse it becomes easier to verify if, among 
those who are the subject of possible bias, there are differences in gender. In carrying out 
this verification, we distinguish between positive bias and negative bias in the 
competition outcomes. We then ask if the weights of the diverse factors that may 
determine the competition outcome indeed differ by gender. The two potential 
determinants of interest are: i) the scientific merit of the candidates, and ii) the 
possibilities for favoritism towards the candidates arising from factors of social proximity 
and research collaboration between the candidates and their evaluators, particularly 
involving the committee president. 
The literature on gender discrimination and inequality in universities features several 
streams of activity, particularly qualitative research based on interviews (Bagilhole, 1993)  
and quantitative research based on surveys and questionnaires (McGuire et al., 2004; 
Wright et al., 2003), as well as analyses of academic faculties and their selection 
procedures (Rotbart et al., 2012; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Ceci and Williams, 2011). 
These studies identify the principle phenomena of gender discrimination as being: lesser 
probability for women to achieve promotion or tenure; lesser probability of obtaining 
leadership roles such as division head, department head, or dean; assignment of salaries 
that are lower than those of their male colleagues. However these studies, often focused 
on selected disciplines, lead to results that are difficult to generalize. Van den Brink et al. 
(2006) overcome these limits in their analysis of the reports from selection committees 
for 682 professorships in seven different disciplines for six large Dutch universities, over 
the period 1999-2003. However these authors themselves note a fundamental limitation 
in their work: the impossibility to elaborate a strict measurement of gender bias, given 
that they are unable to measure the quality of the applicants. The current study overcomes 
this limit by analyzing nearly the entirety of all scientific disciplines active in Italy, and 
evaluating the merit of the applicants through a bibliometric indicator of their research 
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productivity. 
The next section of the paper describes the recruitment process in Italian universities, 
particularly the measures adopted in 2008 for the recruitment of associate professors. 
Section 3 presents the dataset used for the analyses. Section 4 presents the results of our 
analyses on the gender bias, followed by the results of the regression analyses in Section 
5. The work concludes with the authors’ discussion. 
 
 
2. Recruitment in Italian universities 
 
The Italian Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) recognizes a 
total of 96 universities as authorized to issue degrees. Sixty-seven of these are public 
universities, employing around 95% of all Italian faculty members. 
In keeping with the so-called Humboldtian model of university policy, there are no 
“teaching-only” universities in Italy. All professors are required to carry out both research 
and teaching. Legislation includes a provision that each faculty member must provide a 
minimum of 350 hours of teaching per year. All new personnel enter the university system 
through public competitions, and career advancement can only proceed by further public 
competitions. Salaries are regulated at the centralized level and are calculated according 
to role (administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example assistant, 
associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends on merit. 
Moreover, as in all Italian public administration, the dismissal of unproductive employees 
is unheard of. 
The recruitment and advancement of professors is regulated by laws, which are 
overseen by the MIUR. There have been major reforms over recent years. Law 240 of 
2010 introduced a double evaluation procedure for the selection of associate and full 
professors. The first level is a stage of national prequalification for the candidates, 
managed directly by the MIUR. A second stage of evaluations is managed by the 
individual universities, to then choose the prequalified individuals best suited to the 
specific needs of each institution. Prior to Law 240, the processes of recruitment and 
career advancement were in the hands of the individual universities, which were to follow 
procedures set by the national ministry. The last major set of competitions under the old 
system was held in 2008: the relevant data on these competitions, which are the context 
for the present work, is described in Section 3. 
In the Italian university system all professors are classified in one and only field 
(Scientific Disciplinary Sector or SDS, 370 in all), grouped into disciplines (University 
Disciplinary Areas or UDAs, 14 in all)3. In both the new and old system, competitions 
for recruitment and advancement are organized at the SDS level. The 2008 competition 
procedures required appointment of committees to judge the curricula of the candidates. 
Each committee was to be composed of five full professors belonging to the SDS for 
which the position was open. One member, the president, was designated by the 
university holding the competition and the other four were drawn at random from a short 
list of other full professors in the national SDS. The short list was in turn established by 
a vote of all full professors in the national SDS. 
The task of each committee was to provide a judgment of all candidates based on 
examination of their documented qualifications, and name at most two winners. The 
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university announcing the competition could then hire one of the two top finishers. The 
other top finisher remained eligible for hiring by any other university in the national 
system without further competition, at any time over the next five years. 
In order to rationalize the process of the individual competitions over the entire 
system, the MIUR monitored and gathered the hiring proposals of the various universities 
and supported the evaluation procedures through information management systems 
intended to guarantee greater transparency. One of the ministry measures was to provide 
a Web portal4 with all the basic information on the competition procedures, the posts 
available, the number of candidates for each competition, the scheduling of the 
procedures and final results (lists of winners, etc.). The transparency provisions, the 
nomination of a national committee of experts in the field, and the timely issue of 
regulations for the evaluation procedures were all intended to ensure efficiency in the 
selection process. In reality, the characteristics of Italian system – such as the generally 
strong inclination to favoritism, the structured lack of consequences for poor performance 
by research units, and the lack of incentive schemes for merit – undermined the credibility 
of selection procedures for the hiring and advancement of university professors. In a 
preceding work (Abramo et al., 2014b), we revealed several critical issues, particularly 
concerning unsuccessful candidates who remarkably outperformed the competition 
winners in terms of productivity over the subsequent triennium, as well as a number of 
competition winners who resulted as totally unproductive. An analysis of the individual 
competitions showed that almost half of them selected candidates who would go on to 
achieve below-median productivity in their field of reference over the subsequent period. 
In a subsequent study (Abramo et al., 2015b), we found that the most important 
determinant of a candidate’s success was not his or her scientific merit, rather the number 
of their years of service in the same university as the committee president. In the current 
of these studies we now wish to investigate whether gender differences in discrimination 
and favoritism occurred in such competitions. 
 
 
3. Dataset 
 
In 2008, 1,232 competitions for associate professor positions were announced by a 
total of 74 Italian universities. The competitions concerned a total of 299 SDSs. At the 
end of all the selection processes, which lasted an average of over two years, the 
committees had named 2,339 winners from a total of 16,500 candidates5. The ratio of the 
number of competition winners to the size of the existing national associate professor 
faculty was 12.8. The competitions generally announced two winners (only 39 announced 
one winner). 
To ensure the representativeness of publications as proxy of research output for the 
bibliometric assessment of the research merit of candidates, our analysis focuses only on 
the competitions in what we define the “bibliometric sectors”, i.e. those SDSs where at 
least 50% of professors produced at least one publication indexed in the Web of Science™ 
(WoS) over the period 2004-2008. The bibliometric SDSs cover all the hard sciences and 
a few fields of Economics. For the observed period, there were 654 competitions that met 
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such criteria, in a range of 193 SDSs. The only way to identify all the applicants in these 
competitions would be to read the minutes of each competition, as were generally 
published on-line by the individual universities. Given the prohibitive scope of such a 
task we have selected a further subset of 287 competitions was extracted from the 
population (44% of the total 654 in the hard sciences, in 124 SDSs). For this subset, the 
winners (550 in all) represent 22% of the total candidates (2,590). The rate of selection 
was more favorable for candidates who were incumbent assistant professors 
(532/2,314=23.0%) than it was for other individuals (18/276=6.5%). Due to the 
difficulties of authorship disambiguation, our research method is only able to measure the 
productivity of applicants who are already incumbent faculty members, thus our analysis 
of career advancement concentrates solely on the assistant professor candidates. In 
addition, for reasons of robustness, the measure of research productivity must be 
calculated over a sufficiently long period (Abramo et al., 2012a). Because of this, the 
analysis excludes assistant professors who entered faculty less than three years prior to 
the date of the competition. The dataset for the analysis is thus composed of 1,979 
assistant professors, 473 of which were competition winners. Table 1 provides the 
characteristics of our dataset by UDA and its coverage with respect to overall 
competitions in the 193 SDSs of the hard sciences. On average there were nine 
participants per competition, of which eight were Italian-national academics. However 
the number of candidates shows significant variation (standard deviation 5.6), and 16 
competitions involve 20 or more candidates. In the majority of competitions (263 out of 
287) the committee designated two winners, with only 24 competitions resulting in a 
single winner. 
 
Table 1: Population subset selected for analysis (in parentheses the percentage with respect to the overall 
reference population by UDA) 
UDA Competitions 
SDSs 
concerned 
Winners 
Academic winners with 
seniority ≥ 3 years 
Mathematics and computer science 26 (46%) 7 (78%) 50 (46%) 45 (47%) 
Physics 19 (42%) 5 (63%) 37 (43%) 30 (41%) 
Chemistry 25 (46%) 8 (67%) 47 (46%) 44 (48%) 
Earth sciences 6 (30%) 4 (33%) 10 (27%) 5 (17%) 
Biology 25 (34%) 14 (74%) 49 (34%) 39 (31%) 
Medicine 62 (41%) 32 (68%) 116 (40%) 87 (40%) 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 15 (31%) 11 (39%) 27 (29%) 26 (30%) 
Civil engineering 11 (42%) 6 (86%) 22 (43%) 22 (46%) 
Industrial and information engineering 86 (60%) 31 (74%) 170 (62%) 155 (62%) 
Pedagogy and psychology 5 (24%) 3 (60%) 8 (20%) 7 (21%) 
Economics and statistics 7 (39%) 3 (75%) 14 (39%) 13 (41%) 
Total 287 (44%) 124 (64%) 550 (43%) 473 (44%) 
 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics concerning the candidates, by gender. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the candidates involved in the dataset of competitions, by gender 
     Candidates per competition 
  Winners Non winners Total  Average Median Std Dev Max 
Total candidates 
Female 162  586 748 3 2 2.6 14 
Male 388 1,454 1,842 6 5 4.7 24 
Total 550 2,040 2,590 9 8 5.6 29 
Academics 
Female 154 518 672 2 2 2.5 14 
Male 378 1,264 1,642 6 5 4.3 23 
Total 532 1,782 2,314 8 7 5.4 28 
Others 
Female 8 68 76 0 0 0.5 2 
Male 10 190 200 1 0 1.0 5 
Total 18 258 276 1 1 1.2 6 
Academics with seniority 
≥ 3 years 
Female 141 467 608 2 1 2.3 12 
Male 332 1,039 1,371 5 4 3.8 22 
Total 473 1,506 1,979 7 6 4.6 26 
Academics with seniority 
< 3 years 
Female 13 51 64 0 0 0.6 3 
Male 46 225 271 1 1 1.2 5 
Total 59 276 335 1 1 1.3 6 
 
 
4. Bias in academic recruitment 
 
The selection committees judge the applicants for academic positions based on both 
quantitative and qualitative criteria. The committees are free to define the evaluation 
models they will apply, relative to the scientific sector and academic rank of concern. Our 
own investigation of the possible cases of unfair evaluation is based only on the research 
performance of the candidates. Furthermore, The bibliometric assessment of research 
performance by quantity and quality of output neglects other attributes of the scientists’ 
activities, for example the ability to manage research teams, to attract funds, their 
activities in consulting, teaching, editorial work, outreach, and so on. Still, common sense 
would lead one to believe that there is a strong correlation between research productivity 
and all other dimensions of scientific merit. For example, Marsh and Hattie (2002), Elton 
(2001), and Hattie and Marsh (1996) show evidence of a positive correlation between 
research productivity and teaching effectiveness. The assessment of potential cases of 
discrimination and favoritism in academic recruitment is therefore subject to a certain 
degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, like all measures, the FSS measurement itself embeds 
some degree of uncertainty. In the following, when we refer to bias in recruitment, we 
always imply the embedded uncertainty. For simplicity of language we will generally 
refer to negative bias as “discrimination”, and to positive bias as “favoritism”. Because 
of the limits and assumptions embedded in the methodology and performance indicator 
applied to identify possible cases of bias in recruitment, the usual warnings in the 
interpretations of results apply. 
 
 
4.1 Negative bias 
 
We define negative bias (discrimination) as a situation where a non-winner candidate 
is observed to have scientific merit notably higher than that of at least one the competition 
winners, and not less than that of the other non-winner candidates. As the indicator of the 
scientific merit of a candidate we use their research productivity, quantified by an 
indicator named Fractional Scientific Strength, or FSS, which embeds both the number 
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of publications and their field-normalized citations (for a detailed description of the index 
and the underlying theory, see Appendix). 
Since the committees also apply criteria other than research productivity in making 
their selections, we assume that within a difference of 20 FSS percentiles6 the other 
dimensions of merit could compensate for the difference in research productivity. This 
threshold appears reasonable, since it is coherent to expect a positive relation between 
research performance and the other variables of academic merit. Thus if a candidate 
places 20 percentiles above another, according to the convention we adopt, he or she 
surely has more merit. If the difference is less than 20, we cannot affirm that there is a 
difference in merit. Since it is possible that all applicants in a competition would be of 
little merit, in order for a candidate to be defined as “discriminated against” it is also 
necessary that their FSS must in all cases be higher than the median of the national 
performance distribution of all their colleagues of the same rank and SDS. In this regard, 
we also recall the committees would have been free not to name any winners. 
In summary, the conditions necessary for a candidate to be defined as subject to 
negative bias are: 
i. There must be a positive difference of 20 percentiles (national ranking of assistant 
professors, by FSS) between the non-winner candidate and the worst of the 
winners; 
ii. The FSS of the candidate must not be less than the median of the national 
distribution of assistant professors in the SDS; 
iii. There must be a negative difference of performance of not more than 20 
percentiles between the non-winning candidate and the best of those that satisfy 
the first two conditions. 
Given the above conditions there could more than one subject of discrimination per 
competition. 
To ensure a robust analysis of bibliometric productivity (Abramo et al., 2012a), of the 
287 competition analyzed in detail up to this point we now further exclude those 
competitions (44 out of 287) lacking at least a winner and a non-winning participant with 
at least three years in a faculty position over the 2004-2008 period. Given the exclusions, 
we reduce the number of competitions observed to 243. 
We now present the results of the gender differences in discrimination, analyzed from 
two points of view: the numerosity of the subjects of discrimination and the extent of the 
discrimination. 
We first measure the FSS of all candidates and assistant professors in the SDSs where 
the 243 competitions were launched. On the basis of the defined conditions we then 
identify the candidates that were subject to discrimination during the judgment of the 
competition. Finally we investigate the gender differences of such discrimination, by 
UDA (Table 3). 
From the analysis it emerges that there are a total of 323 cases of discrimination out 
of 1,883 applicants, relative to 422 winners. Of the subjects of discrimination, 24.1% are 
women against 75.9% that are men, compared to 30.6% of applicants being female and 
64.9% being male. Student’s t-test confirms that female applicants are significantly less 
subject to discrimination than males (p-value<0.01). 
 
                                                          
6 As explained in detail in the Appendix, the FSS percentile refers to the distribution of productivity of all 
the national assistant professors in the same SDS. 
Table 3: Candidates biased against, applicants, and correlation between FSS and competition outcome, by gender and UDA (% in brackets) 
UDA 
Biased against Applicants Correlation FSS-competition outcome 
F M Tot F M Tot F M Tot 
Mathematics and computer science 7 (21.2) 26 (78.8) 33 101 (35.3) 185 (64.7) 286 0.330*** 0.255*** 0.284*** 
Physics 5 (16.1) 26 (83.9) 31 40 (23.7) 129 (76.3) 169 0.007 0.187* 0.123 
Chemistry 9 (31.0) 20 (69.0) 29 65 (46.1) 76 (53.9) 141 0.108 0.347** 0.207* 
Earth sciences - - - 5 (22.7) 17 (77.3) 22 0.409 0.298 0.313 
Biology 15 (53.6) 13 (46.4) 28 110 (65.5) 58 (34.5) 168 -0.019 -0.090 -0.038 
Medicine 12 (19.0) 51 (81.0) 63 65 (21.9) 232 (78.1) 297 -0.013 0.076 0.062 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 4 (44.4) 5 (55.6) 9 15 (38.5) 24 (61.5) 39 -0.160 -0.146 -0.133 
Civil engineering 2 (8.0) 23 (92.0) 25 24 (21.8) 86 (78.2) 110 0.443** -0.004 0.097 
Industrial and information engineering 16 (17.2) 77 (82.8) 93 113 (19.6) 465 (80.4) 578 0.222** 0.134*** 0.144*** 
Pedagogy and psychology 3 (60.0) 2 (40.0) 5 11 (55.0) 9 (45.0) 20 0.098 0.030 0.055 
Economics and statistics 5 (71.4) 2 (28.6) 7 27 (50.9) 26 (49.1) 53 0.238 0.182 0.216 
Total 78 (24.1) 245 (75.9) 323 576 (30.6) 1,307 (69.4) 1,883 0.140*** 0.101*** 0.113*** 
Statistical significance: *p-value <0.10, **p-value <0.05, ***p-value <0.01. 
Statistical significance level adjusted using Bonferroni corrections 
 
Deepening the examination to the level of the UDAs, the analyses show that the 
incidence of discriminated women out of the total of subjects of discrimination is the 
highest in Biology (53.6%), where we also observe the highest percentage of female 
applicants (65.5%). Civil engineering has the lowest percentage of female subjects of 
discrimination out of the total (8%). The gender differences in terms of concentration of 
those discriminated in relation to concentration of applicants results as significant in three 
UDAs out of 107: men result as more discriminated in Mathematics and computer science 
(p-value = 0.053), Civil engineering (p-value = 0.058), and Chemistry (p-value = 0.069); 
women do not result as more subject to discrimination in any of the UDAs. 
Table 3 also presents the correlation between FSS and competition outcome 
(competition outcome = 1, if the applicant wins the competition; 0, otherwise), by gender 
and UDA. In the case of women, Civil engineering has the highest Pearson correlation 
(0.443). In the case of the men, the highest correlation is observed in Chemistry (0.347). 
For each of the 323 applicants subject to discrimination we measure the level of 
discrimination in percentiles of FSS, calculated as follows: 
D =  FSSd − (FSSw + 20) 
 [1] 
Where: 
D = level of discrimination; 
FSSd = FSS percentile of the candidate discriminated; 
FSSw = FSS percentile of the worst of the winners. 
 
Table 4 shows the average, maximum and standard deviation of the level of 
discrimination, by gender and UDA. 
The general analysis shows that the highest discrimination occurs in Civil engineering 
(average discrimination = 35.4 FSS percentiles), the lowest in Economics and statistics 
(average discrimination = 7.4 FSS percentiles). The average discrimination for women 
candidates is 21.0 FSS percentiles; that for male candidates is 21.1 percentiles. Student’s 
t-test shows that the averages of female and male levels of discrimination are not 
significantly different (p-value=0.459). 
In effect, the gender differences in the level of discrimination result as significant in 
only one UDA out of 10, which is Pedagogy and psychology (34.5 for women vs. 1.9 for 
men, p-value = 0.023). 
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Table 4: Levels of negative bias by gender and UDA, measured in percentiles of FSS  
UDA 
F M Tot 
Avg 
Std 
dev. 
Max 
Avg 
Std 
dev. 
Max 
Avg 
Std 
dev. 
Max 
Mathematics and computer science 11.9 9.0 27.0 12.7 10.9 35.6 12.5 10.4 35.6 
Physics 16.3 10.5 32.8 20.5 15.9 52.1 19.8 15.1 52.1 
Chemistry 20.5 16.2 47.5 18.0 13.2 42.2 18.8 14.0 47.5 
Earth sciences - - - - - - - - - 
Biology 23.1 14.5 59.1 19.0 15.0 57.2 21.2 14.6 59.1 
Medicine 21.6 12.1 37.9 22.9 12.4 50.6 22.6 12.3 50.6 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 25.8 32.5 73.2 37.9 19.0 62.7 32.5 24.8 73.2 
Civil engineering 36.2 47.9 70.1 35.4 31.2 79.2 35.4 31.5 79.2 
Industrial and information engineering 23.1 18.8 58.3 19.7 16.6 73.7 20.3 16.9 73.7 
Pedagogy and psychology 34.5 30.3 58.5 1.9 0.2 2.0 21.5 27.9 58.5 
Economics and statistics 6.6 8.1 19.8 9.6 0.6 10.1 7.4 6.8 19.8 
Total 21.0 17.5 73.2 21.1 17.7 79.2 21.1 17.6 79.2 
 
 
4.2 Positive bias 
 
If there is negative bias (discrimination) against some of the candidates in a 
competition then at least one winner must have undergone positive bias and been favored. 
In this section we analyze the gender differences among those favored in the 
competitions. We define favoritism as the situation where the winner of a competition has 
a lower scientific merit than at least one non-winning candidate, or in any case lower than 
what we would have expected of a winner with respect to all the other colleagues of the 
same academic rank and SDS. 
As in the case of the calculation of discrimination, since FSS is not the only criterion 
for selection in the competitions, we assume that within 20 percentile points the other 
variables for merit could compensate for the difference in research productivity. Thus, if 
a candidate places 20 percentiles below another for FSS, he or she is surely less worthy. 
If the difference is less than 20, this cannot be concluded. 
Summarizing, the sufficient conditions for identifying a candidate as favored in a 
competition are either of the following: 
i. There is a negative difference in performance of not less than 20 percentile points 
(national ranking of assistant professors, by FSS) between the winning candidate 
and the best of the non-winning applicants; 
ii. The FSS of the winner is less than the national median of the assistant professors 
in the SDS. 
As much as the occurrence of the second condition seems unlikely, we observe that: 
in 78 competitions at least one winner showed performance less than the national median; 
in 13 competitions a candidate resulted as selected while satisfying the second condition 
only; in one competition all the candidates had productivity below the national median, 
but two winners were still chosen. The question that naturally arises is not why assistant 
professors with a poor scientific portfolio would have entered the competitions, but why 
those with a high profile did not. Among those familiar with the culture and the practices 
of favoritism in the Italian university environment it is well known that, for purposes of 
“taking turns” in sharing out of positions, full professors will often place pressure on 
worthy assistant professors in their universities to hold back from entering competitions, 
in order not to create problems at the moment when the committees move to select the 
predetermined individual for that occasion. 
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For the same 243 competitions examined in the analysis of discrimination, we thus 
identify those candidates that were favored in the judgment stage and analyze the potential 
gender differences that may have occurred in such favoritism (Table 5). 
From the analysis there emerge a total of 186 favored candidates out of 422 winners and 
1,833 applicants. Some 32.8% of the total favored candidates are women, against 67.2% 
men; compared to 30.6% of the applicants being of female gender and 64.9% male. 
Student’s t-test does not indicate gender differences among favored candidates (p-
value=0.246). 
 
Table 5: Candidates benefitting from positive bias and applicants, by gender and UDA (% in brackets) 
UDA 
Favored candidates Applicants 
F M Tot F M Tot 
Mathematics and computer science 3 (23.1) 10 (76.9) 13 101 (35.3) 185 (64.7) 286 
Physics 6 (33.3) 12 (66.7) 18 40 (23.7) 129 (76.3) 169 
Chemistry 10 (52.6) 9 (47.4) 19 65 (46.1) 76 (53.9) 141 
Earth sciences - - - 5 (22.7) 17 (77.3) 22 
Biology 10 (50) 10 (50) 20 110 (65.5) 58 (34.5) 168 
Medicine 10 (28.6) 25 (71.4) 35 65 (21.9) 232 (78.1) 297 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 3 (50) 3 (50) 6 15 (38.5) 24 (61.5) 39 
Civil engineering 1 (16.7) 5 (83.3) 6 24 (21.8) 86 (78.2) 110 
Industrial and information engineering 15 (24.6) 46 (75.4) 61 113 (19.6) 465 (80.4) 578 
Pedagogy and psychology 3 (60) 2 (40) 5 11 (55) 9 (45) 20 
Economics and statistics 0 (0) 3 (100.0) 3 27 (50.9) 26 (49.1) 53 
Total 61 (32.8) 125 (67.2) 186 576 (30.6) 1,307 (69.4) 1,883 
Deepening the analysis by UDA, we observe that the incidence of favored women in 
the total of favored candidates is highest in Pedagogy and psychology (60.0%). Civil 
engineering has the lowest percentage of favored women in the total (16.7%). Gender 
differences among favored winners result as significant in two UDAs out of 108. In both 
cases it is the men that result as more favored than women: in Economics and Statistics 
(p-value=0.036) and in Biology (p-value=0.061). 
Table 6 shows the level of favoritism in percentiles of FSS, calculated as follows: 
F =  FSSa − (FSSf + 20) 
 [2] 
Where: 
F = level of favoritism; 
FSSa = percentile of FSS of the best non-winner candidate; 
FSSf = percentile of FSS of the favored candidate. 
 
The analyses show the average, the standard deviation and the maximum level of 
favoritism, by gender and UDA. The general analysis shows that the highest level of 
favoritism is in Civil engineering (average favoritism = 35.8 percentiles of FSS), the 
lowest is in Economics and statistics (average = 10.5 percentiles of FSS). The average 
favoritism for the women candidates equals 19.8 percentiles of FSS; that for the men 
candidates equals 19.5 percentiles of FSS. Student’s t-test shows that the averages of 
female and male favoritism or not significantly different (p-value=0.456). 
In the analyses at the more detailed level, the gender differences in level of favoritism 
result as not significant for all the UDAs. 
  
                                                          
8 For Earth sciences, since there are no subjects of favoritism it is not possible to deepen the analyses for 
the gender differences in this regard. 
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Table 6: Level of positive bias by gender and UDA, measured in percentiles of FSS 
UDA 
F M Tot 
Avg 
Std 
dev. 
Max 
Avg 
Std 
dev. 
Max 
Avg 
Std 
dev. 
Max 
Mathematics and computer science 17.4 15.1 27.0 9.7 10.7 35.6 11.5 11.6 35.6 
Physics 20.5 19.2 52.1 17.0 15.0 40.2 18.2 16.1 52.1 
Chemistry 18.3 15.5 47.5 17.1 13.3 39.6 17.7 14.0 47.5 
Earth sciences - - - - - - - - - 
Biology 17.5 10.0 35.0 21.3 18.3 59.1 19.4 14.4 59.1 
Medicine 20.6 13.2 47.9 20.9 12.7 50.6 20.8 12.6 50.6 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 14.9 8.2 23.0 46.4 37.8 73.2 30.6 29.9 73.2 
Civil engineering 21.4 - 21.4 38.7 33.7 79.2 35.8 31.0 79.2 
Industrial and information engineering 21.8 16.7 60.8 18.7 18.5 73.7 19.6 18.0 73.7 
Pedagogy and psychology 24.6 30.0 58.5 2.0 - 2.0 18.9 26.9 58.5 
Economics and statistics - - - 10.5 9.2 19.8 10.5 9.2 19.8 
Total 19.8 14.8 60.8 19.5 18.2 79.2 19.6 17.1 79.2 
 
 
5. Statistical Analysis 
 
For the competitions of our dataset, we formulate a statistical model that links the 
competition outcome to the possible determinants, as described below. 
The dependent variable, the competition outcome, is a Boolean type variable with 
value of 1 in the case that the applicant wins, or 0 otherwise. The eight independent 
variables are: the parental link between applicant and full professors in the same 
university (NE); the career years that an applicant has spent in the same university and 
same SDS as the committee president (CP); the career years that an applicant has spent 
in the same university and the same SDS as other committee members (CE); the 
percentage of the president’s publications coauthored with the candidate (PP); the number 
of other committee members with which the applicant has co-authored publications (PE); 
the applicant’s scientific productivity (FSS) for the five years 2004-2008, as proxy of 
scientific merit; the agreement between the gender of the applicant and the gender of the 
committee president (SP); and the agreement between the gender of the applicant and at 
least three committee members (president included) (SE). 
To study the effect of gender on the eight independent variables which determine the 
competition outcome, we introduce the Boolean independent variable G, whose value is 
1 in the case that the applicant is female, and 0 otherwise. In addition to the eight 
independent variables presented above we introduce in the model the same variables each 
multiplied by G. 
As the basis of the statistical model we choose the logistic regression function 
(linearized by the logit function), which is particularly suited for modeling dichotomous 
dependent variables. Formally, the statistical model is described as: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐺 ∙ 𝐹𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐺 ∙ 𝑁𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐺 ∙ 𝐶𝑃
+ 𝛽8𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽9𝐺 ∙ 𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽11𝐺 ∙ 𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽12𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐺 ∙ 𝑃𝐸
+ 𝛽14𝑆𝑃 + 𝛽15𝐺 ∙ 𝑆𝑃 + 𝛽16𝑆𝐸 + 𝛽17𝐺 ∙ 𝑆𝐸) 
 [3] 
Where: 
logit(p) = log
p(E)
1-p(E)
 [4] 
E = competition outcome: 1, if the applicant wins the competition; 0, otherwise; 
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p(E) = probability of event E; 
β = generic regression coefficient; 
G = 1, if the applicant is female; 0, if the applicant is male. 
FSS = applicant’s research productivity over the period 2004-2008, expressed on a 0-100 
percentile scale; 
NE= 1, if the applicant and a full professor in the same university have the same family 
name; 0, otherwise. 
CP = applicant’s career years in the same university and same SDS as the committee 
president over the period 2001-2010. 
CE = applicant’s career years in the same university and the same SDS as the other 
evaluation committee members over the period 2001-2010. 
PP = percentage of committee president’s publications in co-authorship with the 
candidate over the period 2001-2010. 
PE = number of other committee members with which the applicant has co-authored 
publications over the period 2001-2010. 
SP = 1, if the applicant has the same gender as the committee president; 0, otherwise. 
SE = 1, if the applicant has the same gender as at least three committee members 
(president included); 0, otherwise. 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Prior to applying the statistical model we present the descriptive statistics for the basic 
variables in Table 7, distinguishing by applicant gender. For each variable we show the 
average, standard deviation (SD) and the maximum value occurring for the winners, non-
winners and total applicants in the dataset. 
In the case of the female applicants, the winners’ scientific performance is on average 
higher than that of non-winners (65.13 for winners versus 57.14 for non-winners). The 
average number of years that the female applicant spent in the same university as the 
committee president (CP) is 1.99; for winners this figure rises to 4.16 and for non-winners 
it drops to 1.34. For the set of all female applicants, the average number of years spent in 
the same university as the other committee members (CE) is 1.50, compared to 1.13 for 
the winners and 1.62 for non-winners. Concerning co-authored publications, on average 
the full set of female participants contribute to 2.45% of the president’s scientific 
production; winners contribute to 8.10% and non-winners to 0.75%. Some 14% of the 
female applicants are of the same gender as the committee president; this percentage rises 
to 16% in the case of the winners and remains at 14% for the non-winners. 
In the case of male applicants, once again the winners’ scientific performance is on 
average higher than that of non-winners (69.64 for winners versus 63.80 for non-
winners), although the difference is less than for females (65.13 for winners versus 57.14 
for non-winners). The average number of years that the male applicant spent in the same 
university as the committee president is 2.16; for winners this figure rises to 4.31 and for 
non-winners it drops to 1.47. For the set of all male applicants, the average number of 
years spent in the same university as the other evaluators is 1.17, compared to 1.27 for 
the winners and 1.14 for the non-winners. Concerning research collaboration, on average 
the full set of male participants contribute to 2.34% of the president’s scientific 
production; winners contribute to 6.55% and non-winners to 0.99%. Some 91% of the 
male applicants are the same gender as the committee president; this percentage equals 
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95% in the case of winners and 90% in the case non-winners. Finally, we note that 
concerning the variable NE (signal of possible cases of nepotism), an average of 4% of 
female applicants have the same family name as a full professor in the university holding 
the competition. This percentage increased to 7% in the case of female winners and drops 
to 3% in the case of female non-winners. In the case of male applicants this percentage 
equals 4% both for the winners and non-winners. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for logistic regression variables, by applicant gender 
Female Applicants 
Var. 
Winners Non winners Total 
Avg SD Max Avg SD Max Avg SD Max 
FSS 65.13 21.03 99.12 57.14 24.65 100 58.99 24.08 100 
NE 0.07 0.26 0 0.03 0.17 1 0.04 0.19 1 
CP 4.16 4.37 10 1.34 3.15 10 1.99 3.67 10 
CE 1.13 3.59 20 1.62 4.01 21 1.50 3.92 21 
PP 8.10 18.55 71.88 0.75 4.85 68.89 2.45 10.35 71.88 
PE 0.13 0.42 3 0.09 0.30 2 0.10 0.33 3 
SP 0.16 0.36 1 0.14 0.34 1 0.14 0.35 1 
SE 0.08 0.27 1 0.08 0.27 1 0.08 0.27 1 
          
Male Applicants 
Var. 
Winners Non winners Total 
Avg SD Max Avg SD Max Avg SD Max 
FSS 69.64 24.20 100 63.80 24.93 99.73 65.21 24.87 100 
NE 0.04 0.20 1 0.04 0.20 1 0.04 0.20 1 
CP 4.31 4.37 10 1.47 3.15 10 2.16 3.69 10 
CE 1.27 3.44 20 1.14 3.03 20 1.17 3.13 20 
PP 6.55 16.32 91.18 0.99 6.76 97.36 2.34 10.23 97.36 
PE 0.12 0.35 2 0.08 0.28 2 0.09 0.30 2 
SP 0.95 0.21 1 0.90 0.30 1 0.91 0.28 1 
SE 0.97 0.16 1 0.97 0.16 1 0.97 0.16 1 
 
 
5.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 8 presents the correlations between the basic regressors, comparing the case of 
the female applicants to that of the male applicants. In the case of the women, the Pearson 
correlation analysis indicates that the highest correlations are between CP and PP, at 
0.386, and between CE and PE, at 0.361. This is in line with what we expect, since 
scientists in the same university and SDS would tend to cooperate in shared research 
work. The test of multicollinearity between the variables shows that the average VIF 
(Variance inflation factor) is 1.10. In the case of the male applicants, the Pearson 
correlation analysis indicates that the highest correlations are once again between PP and 
CP (0.356) and PE and CE (0.335). The test of multicollinearity shows that the average 
VIF is 1.09. 
Thus from the Pearson correlation analysis and the test of multicollinearity between 
variables, for both cases of male and female applicants it emerges that the hypothesis of 
independence between the variables can be considered valid. 
 
  
16 
Table 8: Correlation among variables, by applicant gender 
Female applicants 
 E FSS NE CP CE PP PE SP SE 
E 1         
FSS 0.140*** 1        
NE 0.089 0.013 1       
CP 0.326*** 0.054 -0.020 1      
CE -0.052 -0.049 -0.022 -0.188*** 1     
PP 0.300*** 0.026 0.055 0.386*** -0.091 1    
PE 0.060 -0.028 -0.035 -0.137** 0.361*** -0.071 1   
SP 0.023 0.097 -0.058 0.055 0.024 0.026 -0.079 1  
SE -0.002 -0.048 0.003 -0.021 0.028 0.071 -0.014 0.039 1 
 
Male applicants 
 E FSS NE CP CE PP PE SP SE 
E 1         
FSS 0.101*** 1        
NE 0.002 -0.027 1       
CP 0.330*** -0.031 -0.010 1      
CE 0.018 -0.047 0.001 -0.210*** 1     
PP 0.233*** 0.051 -0.017 0.356*** -0.072 1    
PE 0.065 0.033 -0.035 -0.070 0.335*** -0.019 1   
SP 0.081* -0.018 0.027 0.038 -0.002 0.052 0.047 1  
SE -0.000 -0.028 0.012 0.014 0.020 0.011 -0.027 -0.036 1 
Statistical significance: *p-value <0.10, **p-value <0.05, ***p-value <0.01 
Statistical significance level adjusted using Bonferroni corrections 
 
 
5.3 The Logistic Regression Model 
 
Table 9 presents the logistic regression results predicting the competition outcomes. 
The odds ratio for the competition outcomes (i.e. probability of winning the 
competition relative to the probability of not winning) is formalized as: 
𝑝(𝐸)
1 − 𝑝(𝐸)
= exp(−3.282 + 0.404 𝐺 + 0.012 𝐹𝑆𝑆 + 0.004 𝐺 ∙ 𝐹𝑆𝑆 + 0.127 𝑁𝐸 + 0.983 𝐺
∙ 𝑁𝐸 + 0.188 𝐶𝑃 − 0.028 𝐺 ∙ 𝐶𝑃 + 0.067 𝐶𝐸 − 0.085 𝐺 ∙ 𝐶𝐸 + 0.024 𝑃𝑃
+ 0.020 𝐺 ∙ 𝑃𝑃 + 0.435 𝑃𝐸 + 0.533 𝐺 ∙ 𝑃𝐸 + 0.691 𝑆𝑃 − 0.646 𝐺 ∙ 𝑆𝑃
− 0.032 𝑆𝐸 + 0.011 𝐺 ∙ 𝑆𝐸) 
 [5] 
The value eb, calculated for each potential explanatory variable, represents the odds 
ratio (OR)9 in Table 9. The values calculated for standardized b (last column, Table 9) 
permit comparison of the effects of the variables measured in different metrics. 
The data indicate that the factor having the greatest influence on the competition 
outcomes (bStdCP=0.693, p-value<0.01) seems to be the number of the applicant’s years 
in the same university and same SDS as the committee president (CP). In particular, every 
unit increase in the number of career years shared with the president increases the odds 
of success by a factor of 1.207. Gender differences are not significant for this regressor. 
The applicant’s scientific productivity (FSS) also has remarkable bearing on the 
competition results (bStdPP=0.304, p-value<0.01): every percent increase in FSS 
                                                          
9 The “odds ratio” is used in statistics to quantify how strongly the presence or absence of property A is 
associated with the presence or absence of property B, in a given population. In our case, where OR equals 
1 the associated explanatory variable would have no effect on the dependent variable, i.e. on competition 
outcome. 
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increases the odds of success by a factor of 1.012. The effect of the productivity on the 
outcome does not vary with gender. 
Like FSS, the co-authorship of publications with the committee president (PP) also 
has a remarkable weight (bStdFSS=0.246, p-value<0.01), with every unit increase in the 
PP increasing the odds of success by a factor of 1.024. Here too, no gender differences 
occur. Our analysis does not show significant results concerning the weight of PE (i.e. 
the variable concerning shared research work with other committee members). 
The applicant’s career years in the same university as the other (non-president) 
selection committee members (CE) has a notable and significant bearing (bStdCE = 0.228; 
p-value<0.01). Here, gender differences are significant. CE has a greater weight on the 
outcome for male candidates (bStdG*CE = -0.194, p-value=0.046). 
The SP variable (concerning agreement between the gender of the candidate and that 
of the committee president) also seems to have a certain weight (p-value<0.01)10, which 
results greater for male candidates (bG*SP = -0.194, p-value=0.068). 
The presence of a full professor in the same university with the same family name as 
the candidate (NE) has no significant effect on the outcome, although such effect is 
greater for women (bG*NE = 0.983, p-value=0.090). 
Our analysis does not show significant results concerning the weight of SE and G (the 
variables concerning genders of committee members and applicant). 
 
Table 9: Logistic regression results predicting competition outcomes 
 𝑏 OR Std Err Z p>|z| bStdX 
G 0.404 1.498 0.528 0.77 0.444 0.186§ 
FSS 0.012*** 1.012 0.003 4.05 0.000 0.304 
G*FSS 0.004 1.004 0.006 0.72 0.472 0.120 
NE 0.127 1.135 0.330 0.39 0.699 0.025§ 
G*NE 0.983* 2.672 0.580 1.69 0.090 0.108 
CP 0.188*** 1.207 0.018 10.28 0.000 0.693 
G*CP -0.028 0.972 0.033 -0.84 0.402 -0.062 
CE 0.067*** 1.069 0.022 3.05 0.002 0.228 
G*CE -0.085** 0.919 0.043 -1.99 0.046 -0.194 
PP 0.024*** 1.024 0.009 2.65 0.008 0.246 
G*PP 0.020 1.020 0.017 1.18 0.236 0.117 
PE 0.435 1.545 0.281 1.55 0.121 0.135 
G*PE 0.533 1.704 0.423 1.26 0.207 0.100 
SP 0.691*** 1.996 0.262 2.63 0.008 0.324§ 
G*SP -0.646* 0.524 0.354 -1.83 0.068 -0.132§ 
SE -0.032 0.969 0.247 -0.13 0.897 -0.015§ 
G*SE 0.011 1.011 0.500 0.02 0.982 0.002§ 
Constant -3.282*** - 0.420 -7.81 0.000  
§ In this case the standardized coefficient is not considered because the explanatory variable is binary. 
Dependent variable: competition outcome; method of estimation: logistic regression; b = raw coefficient; 
OR= Odds Ratio (exp b); z = z-score for test of b=0; p>|z| = p-value for z-test; bStdX= X standardized 
coefficient. 
Statistical significance: *p-value <0.10, **p-value <0.05, ***p-value <0.01. 
Number of observations = 1,979. 
Chi2 test for joint significance of interaction terms: chi2(17) = 239.85; Prob> chi2 = 0.0000. 
Log likelihood = -940.1292; Pseudo R2 = 0.1362; Std Err. adjusted for 287 clusters (competitions). 
Log likelihood = -940.1292; Pseudo R2 = 0.1362; Std Err. adjusted for 287 clusters (competitions).  
                                                          
10 Note that for NE, SP and SE the standardized coefficients lose meaning since the explanatory variables 
are binary. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In the current economic system, organizations compete at the worldwide level to 
attract and recruit the best talent possible. In this scenario, phenomena of a priori 
discrimination (e.g. for gender, age, culture, ethnicity or religion) imply a loss of 
effectiveness and efficiency in the human resources selection system, and negatively 
affect the organization’s competitiveness. In higher education systems the avoidance of 
discriminatory phenomena becomes still more important, given the role that universities 
plays in supporting industrial competitiveness, socio-economic development and social 
mobility. In competitive higher education systems, elite universities perceive diversity as 
an advantage and compete with one another to bring in the best researchers and teaching 
professors, from both home and abroad. In less competitive systems, such as in many 
European nations, merit is not always the primary criteria for selection. The Italian 
context, which is characterized by high rates of favoritism in competitions for academic 
recruitment, is particularly suited for the investigation of gender differences in terms of 
possible discrimination and favoritism. 
Our results show that, among candidates affected by negative bias, the incidence of 
female candidates is lower than that of male candidates. No gender differences occur 
among candidates who benefitted from positive bias. Our findings do not align with the 
prevalent opinions on the argument, as seen in the literature (e.g. Rotbart et al., 2012; 
Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2004; Wright et al., 2003). There could be 
many reasons for this contrast.  Without attempting to be exhaustive, we can suggest at 
least three: the use of different operative definitions of discrimination, different methods 
of measuring scientific merit, or the differing context of our analysis. However our results 
are in line with the expectations: if the concentration of male top scientists is greater than 
for women (Abramo et al., 2009b; Bordons et al., 2003), then one would in fact expect a 
greater concentration of discrimination against men. Furthermore, there is no evidence of 
gender differences among the favored winners, except in some disciplines where there is 
a greater concentration of male winners that would have not have merited the win 
compared to their female colleagues. 
The results of the statistical analysis show that for the male candidates, the number of 
the candidate’s career years in the same university as the committee members and the 
agreement between the gender of the applicant and that of the committee president assume 
greater weights in the judgment of competition outcomes than they do for the female 
applicants. However, the presence of a full professor in the same university with the same 
family name as the applicant assumes greater weight in the case of the female applicants 
than for the males. 
The relation between academic candidates in the competitions analyzed and the total 
population of assistant professors in the SDSs involved is 12.8% for females (672/5,243) 
and 22.3% for males (1,642/7,373) and shows an unmistakable gender difference in the 
propensity to apply to the observed competitions, which could in part explain the 
phenomenon of the underrepresentation of women in the Italian academic systems, much 
more than any phenomena of bias as revealed by the current study. 
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Appendix - Measuring research productivity 
 
Research activity is a production process in which the inputs consist of human 
resources and other tangible (scientific instruments, materials, etc.) and intangible 
(accumulated knowledge, social networks, etc.) resources, and where outputs have a 
complex character of both tangible nature (publications, patents, conference 
presentations, databases, protocols, etc.) and intangible nature (tacit knowledge, 
consulting activity, etc.). The new-knowledge production function thus has a multi-input 
and multi-output character. The principal efficiency indicator of any production system 
is labor productivity. 
The calculation of labor productivity requires a few simplifications and assumptions. 
In the hard sciences, the prevalent form of codification of research output is publication 
in scientific journals. As a proxy of total output, in this work we consider only the specific 
publications (articles, article reviews, and proceeding papers) indexed in the Thomson 
Reuters WoS. 
When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the production factors 
available to each scientist then one should normalize by them. Unfortunately relevant data 
are not available at the individual level in Italy. The first assumption then is that resources 
available to professors within the same field are the same. The second assumption is that 
the hours devoted to research are more or less the same for all professors. Given the 
characteristics of the Italian academic system as depicted in section 2.1, the above 
assumptions appear acceptable. 
Because of the differences in the publication intensity across fields, a prerequisite of 
any distortion-free performance assessment is the classification of each researcher in one 
and only one field (Abramo et al. 2013a). 
Most bibliometricians define productivity as the number of publications in the period 
of observation. Because publications have different values (impact), we prefer to adopt a 
more meaningful definition of productivity, i.e. the value of output per unit value of labor, 
all other production factors being equal. The latter recognizes that the publications 
embedding new knowledge have different value or impact on scientific advancement, 
which bibliometricians approximate with citations or journal impact factors. Provided 
that there is an adequate citation window (at least two years) the use of citations is always 
preferable (Abramo et al. 2011). Because citation behavior varies by field, we standardize 
the citations for each publication with respect to the average of the distribution of citations 
for all the Italian cited publications of the same year and the same WoS subject category11. 
Furthermore, research projects frequently involve a team of professors, which is 
registered in the co-authorship of publications. In this case we account for the fractional 
contributions of scientists to outputs, which is at times further signaled by the position of 
the authors in the byline. 
At the individual level, professors of the same academic rank in this specific case, we 
can measure the average yearly productivity, named Fractional Scientific Strength (FSS), 
in the following way12: 
 
 
                                                          
11 Abramo et al. 2012b demonstrated that the average of the distribution of citations received for all cited 
publications of the same year and subject category is the best-performing scaling factor. 
12 A more extensive theoretical dissertation on how to operationalize the measurement of productivity can 
be found in Abramo and D'Angelo 2014. 
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Where: 
t = number of years of work of the researcher in the period of observation; 
N = number of publications of the researcher in the period of observation; 
ci = citations received by publication i; 
c̅ = average of the distribution of citations received for all cited publications of the same 
year and subject category of publication i; 
𝑓𝑖= fractional contribution of the researcher to publication i. 
Fractional contribution equals the inverse of the number of authors in those fields 
where the practice is to place the authors in simple alphabetical order but assumes 
different weights in other cases. For the life sciences, widespread practice in Italy is for 
the authors to indicate the various contributions to the published research by the order of 
the names in the byline. For the life science SDSs, we give different weights to each co-
author according to their order in the byline and the character of the co-authorship (intra-
mural or extra-mural) (see Abramo et al. 2013b, 2013c). If first and last authors belong 
to the same university, 40% of citations are attributed to each of them; the remaining 20% 
are divided among all other authors. If the first two and last two authors belong to different 
universities, 30% of citations are attributed to first and last authors; 15% of citations are 
attributed to second and last author but one; the remaining 10% are divided among all 
others13. 
Data on research staff of each university, such as years of employment in the observed 
period, academic rank and their SDS classification are extracted from the database on 
Italian university personnel, maintained by the Ministry for Universities and Research14. 
Unfortunately, information on leaves of absence is not available and cannot be accounted 
for in the calculation of yearly productivity, to the disadvantage of women on maternity 
leave in the period of observation. The bibliometric dataset used to measure FSS is 
exctracted from the Italian Observatory of Public Research (ORP), a database developed 
and maintained by the authors and derived under license from the Thomson Reuters WoS. 
Beginning from the raw data of the WoS, and applying a complex algorithm for 
reconciliation of the author’s affiliation and disambiguation of the true identity of the 
authors, each publication (article, article review and conference proceeding) is attributed 
to the university scientist or scientists that produced it (D’Angelo et al., 2011). Thanks to 
this algorithm we can produce rankings of research productivity at the individual level, 
on a national scale. Based on the value of FSS we obtain, for each SDS, a ranking list 
expressed on a percentile scale of 0-100 (worst to best) for comparison with the 
performance of all Italian colleagues of the same academic rank and SDS. 
 
 
                                                          
13 The weighting values were assigned following advice from senior Italian professors in the life sciences. 
The values could be changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
14 http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php. Last access 26/10/2015. 
